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GORDON v. JUSTICE COURT:
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A COMPETENT
TRIBUNAL
By Lynda D. Nelson*
Introduction
Trial courts of limited jurisdiction ... have unlimited capacity
to affect public attitudes toward law for better or worse. It is these
courts, not the appellate courts, that the people generally know first
hand. What they observe there of justice or injustice, of effi-
ciency or bumbling, determines whether they will look upon courts
with respect and pride or with cynicism.'
The quality of justice available in our lower courts should be a
matter of first importance to everyone concerned with the quality of
justice in our society. The abilities of the judges of the "popular
courts" are often as crucial to the just determination of the rights of
criminal defendants as are the abilities of defense counsel. Although
the right to effective assistance of counsel has been established in the
last decade as a right which is essential to the fair trial of criminal de-
fendants in the United States,2 the importance of an educated and
experienced judge to the fairness of the trial has been undervalued.
When the California Supreme Court was recently faced in Gordon v.
Justice Court' with a challenge to the constitutionality of allowing a
judge who was not an attorney to preside over a criminal trial, the court
determined that the capability of a judge to deal with legal issues
involving the rights of a criminal defendant was indeed crucial to the
guaranty of a fair trial. In a unanimous decision the court held that
denial of an attorney judge to an accused facing the possibility of incar-
ceration on conviction is a denial of due process under the United States
Constitution.4 The decision may someday become a landmark in the
due process area, as it marks the first time that a court has indicated
* Member, third year class.
1. Traynor, Rising Standards of Courts and Judges, 40 CAL. ST. BJ. 677, 688-89
(1965).
2. See text accompanying notes 92-101 infra.
3. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S.
938 (1975).
4. Id. at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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that the "justice" guaranteed by the Constitution to those facing loss
of liberty may comprehend the right to a competent judiciary.
This note will explore the basis and import of the Gordon decision
and will contrast its judicially imposed requirement of bar admission
with the solutions attempted by various state legislatures to guarantee
the judicial competence of lower court judges.
I. Gordon v. Justice Court: A Synopsis
Lewis Gordon and Santiago Arguijo were charged with serious
misdemeanor crimes and their cases were set for trial before lay judges.
Lewis Gordon was charged wih disturbing the peace and failing to dis-
perse.' Santiago Arguijo was charged with driving under the influence
of alcohol.' Both Gordon and Arguijo moved to disqualify the justice
court judges presiding over their cases 7 on the grounds that a nonattor-
ney judge was per se unqualified to preside over a criminal case.
After their motions to disqualify for cause were denied, the
petitioners sought extraordinary pretrial relief on behalf of themselves
and all other defendants in criminal proceedings presided over by lay
judges.8 A general demurrer to the petition was sustained without
leave to amend, and the lower court ruling was affirmed by the court
of appeal.9 By the time the appeal from denial of the extraordinary
writ was heard in the California Supreme Court, both Gordon and
Arguijo had pleaded guilty to lesser charges before attorney judges.1 '
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court elected not to hold
the case moot, since it raised an issue of "broad public interest that is
likely to recur .. . ."" In a unanimous opinion written by Acting
Chief Justice Burke, the court held that a lay judge may not preside
over a trial where an accused faces a potential jail sentence, unless the
defendant waives his or her right to an attorney judge.12  The court
based its decision on the right to a fair trial, which is protected under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.13  The decision came after years of widespread
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 415, 416 (West 1970).
6. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102(a) (West 1971).
7. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 170.8 (West Supp. 1975) (providing for disqualifica-
tion of a judge for cause).
8. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 326, 525 P.2d 72, 74, 115 Cal. Rptr.
632, 634 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
9. Id.
10. Id. n.1.
11. Id. at 326, 525 P.2d at 74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634, quoting In re William M.,
3 Cal. 3d 16, 23, 473 P.2d 737, 741, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (1970).
12. Id. at 327, 525 P.2d at 74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
13. Id. at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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criticism of the lay judge system and recognition of the need for reform
of the lower court systems in general. 14 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari on the question, however, and as a result Cali-
fornia now recognizes a due process right that is unrecognized in all
other states.
In its decision the court stressed that, although the office of lay
judge had its roots in the early Anglo-Saxon judicial system, the lay
judge system could not be permitted to continue if, when examined in
a modem context, it effected a denial of constitutional rights. 5
According to the court's analysis, the justice of the peace system devel-
oped in different circumstances than those that exist today. Communi-
cations and transportation have improved and attorneys are more
readily available. Such changes have relieved the state of the neces-
sity of placing lay persons in judicial positions.'6 Moreover, criminal
14. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Challenge to the Justice of the Peace Court in
Mississippi, 44 Miss. LJ. 996 (1973); Dolan & Fenton, The Justice of the Peace in
Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REV. 457 (1969); Uhlman, Justifying Justice Courts, 52 JUIDICA-
tuRE 22 (1968); Note, The Justice of the Peace: Constitutional Questions, 69 W. VA. I.
REV. 314 (1967); Note, The Justice of the Peace in Virginia: A Neglected Aspect of the
Judiciary, 52 VA. L. REV. 151 (1966); Note, The Justice of the Peace Court in Florida,
18 U. FLA. L. REV. 109 (1965); Vanlandingham, The Decline of the Justice of the Peace,
12 U. KANs. L. REv. 389 (1964); Nordberg, Farewell to Illinois J.P.'s, 40 CH.-KENT L.
REV. 23 (1963); McDonald, An Obituary Note on the Connecticut Justice of the Peace,
35 CONN. B.J. 411 (1961); Banyon, Justice Court on Trial, 37 MICH. ST. BJ. 35 (1958);
Giese, Why Illinois Proposes to Abolish Justice of the Peace Courts, 46 ILL. B. J. 754
(1958); Keebler, Our Justice of the Peace Courts, A Problem in Justice, 9 TENN. L.
REv. 1 (1930); Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CALEF.
L REv. 118 (1927). See also CoMmissIoN ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINiSTRATION
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Standards Relating to Court Organization 40 (Fi-
nal Draft 1974), which recommends in pertinent part that all judges "should have a
broad general and legal education and should have been admitted to the bar . ... In
addition to these qualifications:
(1) Trial judges. Persons selected as trial judges should have had substantial ex-
perience in the adversary system, preferably as judges or judicial officers in other trial
courts, or as trial advocates, and in any event should have had experience in the prepara-
tion, presentation, or decision of legal argument and matters of proof." Id. at § 1.21(a).
15. 12 Cal. 3d at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The court relied
on Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) for the proposition that "[djue process of
law.., conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendi-
ous expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic
to our free society. But basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even
though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal
verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is
deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is
not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the
limits or the essentials of fundamental rights." Id. at 27.
16. The Gordon court commended the- various measures which have been adopted
over the last 25 years to improve the justice court system, but pointed out that they have
been inadequate to dispel the possibility that the nonattorney judge will not be able to
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law and procedure have become extremely complex, making this
body of law increasingly difficult for persons with no legal education
to master."
The court's holding, in effect, created a conclusive presumption
that lack of admission to the California bar makes a judge incapable
of administering criminal justice in the state. The logic of the holding
turns on the court's factual finding that a judge's legal training is rele-
vant to the "fairness" of an individual trial. Since the right to a fair
trial is accepted as a right fundamental to our system of justice, it is
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.'
8
Once classified as "fundamental,"' 9 the right to an attorney judge may
be granted if there is a mere reasonable likelihood of prejudice resulting
from its denial.2 0 Finding that "the increasing complexity of criminal
law and criminal procedure has greatly enhanced the probability that
a layman will be unable to deal effectively with the complexities
inherent in a criminal trial,"'2 1 the court concluded that, "the likelihood
of such a [fair] trial would be substantially diminished," if a lay judge
presided. 2  Accordingly, the court held that the use of lay judges to
preside over criminal trials should be curtailed.
The rationale of the Gordon decision will be examined in more
detail in Section RI. But it will be helpful in the following discussion
of the case to diverge briefly to examine the background and structure
of the justice court system which existed in California at the time of
the Gordon decision.
afford the defendant a fair trial. 12 Cal. 3d at 333, 525 P.2d at 78-79, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 638-39.
17. Id. at 327-28, 525 P.2d at 74-75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
18. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
19. To be classified as such, a right must be among those "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions," Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926), and "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
This distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights should not be con-
fused with the more narrow sense in which the United States Supreme Court has labeled
some rights "fundamental" in the equal protection area in order to accord a strict scru-
tiny to any restrictions placed on them.
20. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 329, 525 P.2d 72, 76, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 632, 636 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975). The court relied on Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 287,
486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971); and Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375,
438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968), in support of the reasonable likelihood test.
21. 12 Cal. 3d at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
22. Id. at 329, 525 P.2d at 76, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
1180 [Vol 2
H. The California Justice Court System
Lay judges have played an important role in the California judi-
cial system. The California Constitution of 1849 created the office of
justice of the peace,23 but no provision of the early constitution required
that the justices be attorneys. Justice courts themselves were first estab-
lished in 1880 with jurisdiction over a wide variety of civil actions in-
volving amounts up to $300,24 and over petty larceny, assault and
battery, breaches of the peace and all misdemeanors punishable by a fine
not in excess of $500.25 No minimum educational requirements for jus-
tice court judges were specified.26 The expansive California lower court
system as we know it today, comprised of both municipal and justice
courts, evolved from these modest beginnings.2Y As early as 1930, how-
ever, well-informed and concerned groups recognized the inadequacies of
the justice court system in California and pressed for changes in the
lower courts, including filling the need for properly trained and edu-
cated justice court judges. 8
The California Legislature has responded to much of the criticism
aimed at the state court system and has attempted periodically to up-
grade the quality of justice available in the state. The most signifi-
cant changes which the system has undergone were brought about by
the 1950 Court Reorganization Plan, which established the basic struc-
ture of the present lower court system. The court reorganization was
stimulated by a 1947 study undertaken by the California Judicial Coun-
cil, which found that the California lower court system was complicated,
inefficient and uneconomical.29  The study showed that the absence of
23. CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 1 (1849).
24. Act of March 11, 1872, ch. 5, § 112, [1880] CAL. Crv. PRo. CODE 63-64
(1880).
25. Id. § 115 at 65.
26. See id. § 85 at 55; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 11 (1879).
27. Hennessey, Qualifications of California Justice Court Judges: A Dual System,
3 PAc. LJ. 439-43 (1972).
Inferior courts in California are currently comprised of municipal and justice courts.
At the end of the 1972-73 fiscal year, there were 76 municipal courts with 380 autho-
rized judgeships handling a total of 4,591,842 nonparking filings and 6,666,645 parking
filings. Two hundred twenty-one justice courts, almost all of which were single-judge
courts, handled 871,223 nonparking and 317,894 parking filings. JuIcr.AL CouNcir.L OF
CALiFORNmA, 1974 ANN. REP. 139, 145.
28. See, e.g., JuIcrAL CouNciL OF CALiFORNrA TuEn BmNNL REP. 40 (1930);
Report of Committee to Survey Inferior Court Structure of California, 19 CAL. ST.
BJ. 236 (1944); Report of Committee on County Courts, 21 CAL. ST. B.J. 244 (1946);
Report of Court Survey Group, 7 JUSTICE AND CONSTABLE, no. 8 at 11 (1947); JuDicL
CouNciL oF CALtso.Nu FouRTEENTH BmiNNrAL REP. 22-23 (1953); S.B. 979, 1967 Reg-
ular Session; STAi- REPORT OF CALifORNA SENATE Coisi.mrrrn ON GOVEZNMENTAL EF-
PCimNCy, Choosing Justice Court Judges 3 (Dec. 1967).
29. See JuDIcIAL Cour~ci OF CALIFoRmN TwEr. BmNNLL REP. 15 (1948). At
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minimum qualifications for many judges resulted in a great number of
judges who had no legal training and who devoted much of their time
to other occupations. 30
In accordance with its findings, the Judicial Council submitted
recommendations for legislation to remedy the defects in the courts and
to replace them with only two types-municipal courts in judicial dis-
tricts with populations of 40,000 or more, and justice courts in districts
of less than 40,000.31 The state bar and other concerned groups
favored requiring full-time attorney judges in all courts. 2 However,
rural county legislators, lay judges and constables opposed curtailing the
use of lay judges. s3 Because of this, the Justices' and Constables' Asso-
ciation proposed a qualifying examination as an alternative prerequisite
to a judgeship, and this proposal won out as a compromise measure.34
Under the system developed in 1950 and still in use at the time
of the Gordon decision, a candidate could qualify for election or
appointment to a justice court judgeship by admission to the state bar,
by successful completion of the qualifying examination administered by
the Judicial Council or by being blanketed in by a grandfather clause.3 5
The California Constitution gives the legislature complete authority to
determine the organization and jurisdiction of the justice courts.3 6 The
legislature had delegated to the county boards of supervisors the author-
ity to establish the boundaries of judicial districts within their counties,
the time there were 767 inferior courts of six different types, operating under a variety
of constitutional, statutory, municipal and county provisions. This resulted in an over-
lapping of functions and jurisdictions in many geographical areas and in a lack of uni-
foimity in judicial procedure and the selection of judges. The large number of low-vol-
ume courts necessitated an inefficient distribution of financial resources. The amount
of funds available for court operations varied according to the number and types of courts
in an area and the attitude of local governing boards toward court financing. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 17.
32. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON INC., CALIFORNIA LowER CouRT STUDy 3 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as LowER COURT STUDY].
33. Id.
34. See JuDicIAL CouNcrL OF CALrnoRNI TWELFTH BxENNiAL REP. 16, 18 (1948);
LOWER COURT STuDY 4.
35. CALFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE § 71601 (West 1964) provides: "[n]o person
is eligible to the office of judge of a justice court unless he either has been admitted
to practice before the State Supreme Court or has within four years preceding his elec-
tion or appointment passed a qualifying examination under regulations prescribed by the
Judicial Council. So long as a person who qualifies for the office of judge by passing
such examination remains an incumbent of such office, he shall be eligible to election
or re-election to such office. This section does not apply to the incumbent of a super-
seded inferior court who succeeds to the office of judge of a justice court or is elected
to such office at the first election of judges pursuant to the Municipal and Justice Court
Act of 1949 or the provisions of law succeeding that act, or who seeks re-election to
such office."
36. CAL. CONST. arL 6, § 5.
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the salaries of justice court personnel, the location and type of justice
court facilities and the authority to fill vacancies which arose between
elections.3" Before the Gordon decision, the legislature had given justice
courts jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine
of $1000, a year's imprisonment in the county jail, or both.28 Although
the Gordon holding now precludes lay judges from presiding over crim-
inal cases where imprisonment may result, they may still act as magis-
trates"9 with authority to preside over preliminary hearings.
40
Critics continued to attack the inadequacies of justice courts,
despite the reforms promulgated in 1950. In 1971, the Judicial Coun-
cil of California instituted a new study of the California lower court sys-
tem. The study, called the California Lower Court Study, found the
lower court system inefficient, nonuniform, expensive and unresponsive
to a variety of needs.41 It especially failed to meet the need for judges
with criminal law experience.42 In addition, the system was found to
be deficient in opportunities for the continuing training and professional
development of judges.43 The failure to provide training for judges
once in office particularly affected the quality of justice dispensed by
lay judges, many of whom lacked the opportunity to readily consult
with attorney judges.44 Even in those counties where attorney judges
were available for consultation, the California court organizational sys-
tem failed to give attorney judges the formal authority or responsibility
to advise a lay judge on legal questions.45 Moreover, the low volume
of cases of many part-time justice court judges virtually assured that
the lay judges would not have an opportunity to learn through exper-
ience, since low-volume courts did not expose the judges to a wide
range of judicial assignments and cases. Furthermore, these part-time
judgeships could only justify a limited salary, so that many part-time
judges were forced to engage in concurrent occupations. 46 As a result,
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 71180.3 (West Supp. 1975).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1425 (West Supp. 1975).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 808 (West 1970).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 858 (West 1970).
41. See generally LowER CouRT STUDY.
42. Id. at 9, 27-28.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Lower Court Study found that "[slince these part-time judgeships can only
justify a limited salary, they generally tend to attract either: (1) retired persons using
the judicial salary to supplement their retirement income, or (2) persons already engaged
in a business or professional occupation who desire the judicial position for either supple-
mentary income or its prestige value. Neither of these two conditions are particularly
desirable in the recruitment of high-caliber judicial personnel. It should be noted that
some judges now holding part-time positions oppose making their judicial role full-time
because it would restrict their ability to carry on their other business or occupation."
Id. at 27.
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they did not have the time or incentive to keep abreast of changes in
the law and court procedure or to pursue professional training. 7
The study concluded that, "[tlhe use of lay judges to handle cases
requiring legal background and training, insights and attitudes. . . can
create problems in the adjudication of cases. '48 It recommended that
the state establish a county court system to replace the present munici-
pal/justice court system.49 The proposed system would have one
judicial officer, a county court judge having the qualifications of the
present municipal court judge. 50 One subordinate judicial officer, the
county commissioner, would be appointed by the county court judge
and would be required to be a licensed attorney, unless no attorneys
were available. 5'
The study also recommended that the number of judicial districts
be reduced to one for each county and that, if the counties were not
large enough to justify full-time judicial staffing, they be consolidated
into multicounty organizations.52 The new lower court system would
be state financed and supervised.53
The subsequent Unified Trial Court Feasibility Study,5 4 also spon-
sored by the Judicial Council, grew out of the Lower Court Study. It
explored the possibility of converting the lower courts of general juris-
diction into a uniform system. Due to the findings of the Lower Court
Study, the Unified Trial Court Feasibility Study recommended that lay
judges be phased out of the lower courts as quickly as possible.55 It
concluded that a single-level trial court with one type of judge was
the most desirable form of organization for the lower courts, but recom-
mended achievement of this goal through a three-step process.58 The
first step would be the enactment of legislation and a proposed constitu-
tional amendment in 1972 to create an administrative structure for
unification of the lower courts.57 The actual unification of the lower
courts would take place gradually. Stage two would accommodate the
implementation of detailed legislation and planning so that the unified
court system could be phased in gradually in the third stage on an indi-
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 27-28.
49. Id. at 50.
50. Id. at 81.
51. Id. at 82.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 96.
54. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., CAriFomru UrNn TimAL CouRT FE. sI-
BIrrY STUDY (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNED TamL COURT STUDY].
55. See id. at A 41.
56. Id. at A 41-43.
57. Id. at A 43-49.
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vidual county basis beginning in January of 1975.58 The Judicial
Council suggested that the state assume the costs of salaries and fringe
benefits of all judicial personnel.59
Accordingly, Senate Constitutional Amendment 15 and Senate
Bills 296 and 297 were introduced in 1972 to effectuate the Judicial
Councis recommendations.60  A number of other measures and con-
stitutional amendments were proposed in the same year containing
similar proposals in both the senate and the assembly.61 However,
none of these measures received favorable action by the legislature and
none of the proposed constitutional amendments were submitted to the
voters in the general election. Since that time all attempts to imple-
ment the recommendations of the Unified Trial Court Feasibility Study
have similarly failed.
Thus, when Gordon was decided in 1974, the inadequacies of the
lay judge system had been extensively examined and the case for
reform had been adequately presented, but the California Legislature
had been unable to effectuate the necessary changes. Since the legis-
lature had failed to act, it remained for the California Supreme Court
to find that the lay judge system contained an inadequacy of constitu-
tional dimension.
Ill. Gordon's Implications: An Emerging Right to a
Competent Tribunal
Gordon v. Justice Court explicitly holds only that a defendant
charged with a crime that carries a possible prison sentence has the
right to be tried before an attorney judge.62 Implicit in the rationale
underlying the Gordon opinion, however, is the notion that due process
requires a competent tribunal.
The Inadequacy of the Lay Judge to Meet the Demands of
the Modern Judicial System
In Gordon, the California Supreme Court examined the present
state of the law and found that, due to the recent expansion of the rights
of the accused, presiding over a criminal trial has become very complex
and difficult.68 The court determined that the issues to be dealt with
in a criminal trial may well be beyond the lay judge's training and ex-
58. Id. at A 50-61.
59. JUDIcAL CouNciL oF CALIFORNmA, 1972 ANN. REP. 21.
60. S.B. 296 and S.B. 297 (1972 Regular Session); Senate Constitutional Amend-
ment 15 (1972 Regular Session).
61. Senate Constitutional Amendments 41, 57 (1972 Regular Session); S.B. 852,
1152 (1972 Regular Session); A.B. 159, 160 (1972 Regular Session).
62. 12 Cal. 3d at 327, 525 P.2d at 74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
63. Id. at 330-31, 525 P.2d at 77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
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perience6 4 It concluded that, because of the complexity and difficulty
of the present state of the criminal law, a reasonable probability exists
that a judge who has not been trained in the law would not be able
to understand the substance and import of the law to be used and would
not be adept at the process of applying this law to specific instances.65
Although the court did not premise its decision merely on an analogy
between the right to an attorney and the right to an attorney judge,
the opinion suggests that the problems of law involved in criminal trials
are as difficult for a judge to understand and deal with as they are for
one acting in the capacity of counsel. 66
The court's findings are supported by the vast number of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions in the criminal procedure
area which have both expanded the rights of the accused and compli-
cated their protection.67 Nearly all of the guarantees of the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been made applicable to the states
in recent years through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while other decisions have strengthened these same guar-
antees. Dramatic changes have taken place in the past fifteen years
under federal precedents affecting such interests as the right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure, 68 the privilege against self-in-
crimination, 9 the inadmissibility of certain confessions, 0 the right to
64. See id. at 332-33, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
65. See id. at 329-33, 525 P.2d at 76-79, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636-39.
66. See id. at 332-33, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
67. See generally, TIm BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL REvoLUTIoN
AND ITS AFrERMATH (1972). See notes 68-77 infra.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 43 U.S.L.W. 5028 (U.S. June 30,
1975) (reasonable suspicion required prior to questioning person about his citizenship);
United States v. Ortiz, 43 U.S.L.W. 5026 (U.S. June 30, 1975) (probable cause required
for fixed checkpoint searches); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(probable cause required for roving border searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, '403
U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view of objects inside house furnishes probable cause but does
not authorize entry to seize without a warrant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (scope of search incident to arrest); Spinelli- v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969) (search warrant affidavits); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limitations of
exclusionary rule); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (search not justified by
what it produces); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (4th Amendment protects
people not places); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (content of affidavit required
for probable cause); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 t1963) (the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule
applied to states).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 43 U.S.L.W. 4815 (U.S. June 23, 1975) (5th
Amendment does not extend to statements elicited by investigator on behalf of defend-
ant); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) and Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (scope of immunity required); Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (barring comment on failure to testify); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (full privilege against self-incrimination must be accorded
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a fair71 and speedy trial,72 the right to a trial by jury,73 the right to
counsel, 74 the right to confrontation of witnesses,75 the right to fair
treatment in sentencing,76 and freedom from double jeopardy.77  A
by states); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (intergovernmental im-
munity).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 43 U.S.L.W. 4806 (U.S. June 23, 1975) (re-
spondent's silence during custodial interrogation inadmissible as "prior inconsistent state-
ment"); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements inadmissible against de-
fendant in case in chief may be admissible to impeach); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324
(1969) ("in custody" interrogations include those in defendant's home); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (procedural protections afforded during custodial interroga-
tions); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (determination of "voluntariness" of con-
fessions); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confession excluded when made
after denial of counsel).
71. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt
constitutionally required); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (failure to control
news coverage to protect jury's impartiality is denial of fair trial); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) (televising of a notorious trial is denial of fair trial).
72. See, e.g., Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (prejudice to defendant not
necessary); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (no inflexible test-a variety of rele-
vant factors); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (8 years to trial was not speedy
trial); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (state's duty to make "good faith effort");
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial applicable to states as
a fundamental right).
73. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (unanimous verdict not required in state court cases); Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (potential sentence of 6 months makes offense "seri-
ous"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-person jury upheld); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (fundamental nature of right to jury trial makes it ap-
plicable to states); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) and Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (no constitutional right not to be tried by a jury).
74. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 43 U.S.L.W. 5004 (June 30, 1975) (there is
a constitutional right not to have counsel); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)
(right to counsel does not apply to photographic displays); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972) (waiver of counsel must be intelligent and understandingly made); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel does not apply to pre-ndictment line-
ups); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel extended to misde-
meanor defendants); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel applied
to preliminary hearings); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel
applied to post-indictment lineups); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to appointed counsel extended to defendants in state felony prosecutions).
75. See, e.g., Brnton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (out-of-court confession
by codefendant inadmissible in joint trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (use
of prior testimony without opportunity for cross-examination invalidated).
76. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (invalidating imprisonment as
alternative to paying fine); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (judge must deter-
mine that guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent before acceptance); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at deferred sentencing-probation revocation pro-
ceeding).
77. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (no jeopardy attaches
when mistrial declared after jury was impaneled and sworn but before any evidence was
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similar expansion of the rights of the criminal defendant has taken
place in the California courts under California precedents.78  As a
result, greater demands have been placed on lower court judges who
must implement these decisions. It is now essential, therefore, that the
judge presiding at a criminal trial understand and be able to apply a
highly complex, constantly evolving body of law.
The responsibilities of the judge presiding over a misdemeanor
trial are numerous and weighty. They begin at voir dire examination
and continue through determination of guilt. In addition to resolving
complex constitutional issues, the judge must determine the accept-
ability of guilty pleas and must make proper sentencing decisions. In
California, justice court judges may be called upon to preside over jury
trials. One of their most important functions in this respect is to
shield the jury from misleading arguments and improper evidence. 0
When making such evidentiary determinations, the trial judge must
weigh the legal merits of the arguments of opposing counsel, both of
whom are often convincing and trained advocates. Both the defendant
and the state face the possibility of being prejudiced by a determination
taken); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) (rendition of a higher sentence
upon retrial following reversal of a conviction does not constitute double jeopardy);
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (the constitutional guarantee against double jeo-
pardy embodies collateral estoppel); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970) (jeopardy
is risk of conviction, not punishment itself); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971)
(reprosecution after trial judge discharged jury and declared mistrial without defendant's
consent is double jeopardy); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (state and munici-
pality may not be treated as separate sovereigns for purposes of double jeopardy); Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy provision applies to states
through the 14th Amendment); Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966) (trial for greater
offense bars prosecution for lesser offense); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959);
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (successive prosecutions by separate sov-
ereigns does not constitute double jeopardy).
78. See, e.g., People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1970) (required disclosure of plea bargain); In re Tall, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449,
81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969) (protections afforded during guilty pleas); People v. Rosales,
68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d
586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967) (prohibition against no-knock entry); In re
Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967) (elements necessary
for effective waiver of counsel); People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 457 (1967); In re Woods, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P.2d 913, 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966)
(illegally obtained prior conviction is inadmissible for impeachment); People v. Aranda,
63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) (statement of codefendant in
joint trial is inadmissible).
79. CAL. Civ. PRo. CoDE § 231 (West Supp. 1975).
80. 'The Court is no longer confined, if such ever was the rule, to the role of sit-
ting as a mere arbitrator between opposing counsel. It is the function of the court to
see that errors or extraneous matters are not brought into the case, which might have
the effect of clouding the issue or confusing the jury." Fortner v. Bruhn, 217 Cal. App.
2d 184, 191, 31 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1963).
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of the trial judge which is based on criteria other than the legal merits.81
In Gideon v. Wainwright 2 it was established that a lay person can-
not be expected to be capable of determining whether the evidence
offered in a trial is legally admissible or whether it is legally sufficient
to establish the crime charged.83 Yet these are the very determinations
that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to make. At times a judge
must also make determinations of fact and law under situations requir-
ing him to disregard the truthfulness and probative value of illegally
obtained evidence which he has heard in its full and potentially incrimi-
nating detail. Yet it has been held unconstitutional to entrust to a lay
person determinations requiring the segregation of the issue of admis-
sibility from the issues of truthfulness and guilt.84 There is no reason
to believe that a judge with little more legal knowledge and training
than the average juror can separate these issues any more skillfully than
could the juror. The intricacies and vagaries of legal concepts are not
capable of being grasped instantly or facilely. Although some lay
judges may have acquired expertise with the law through years of ex-
perience, only the most diligent and conscientious would acquire such
knowledge and keep abreast of continuing changes in return for the
insufficient financial remuneration which was provided by the office at
the time of the Gordon decision.
85
A judge must be capable of making the judicial determinations
entrusted to him by applying relevant law. It is obviously impossible
for a judge to discharge an obligation to apply the law if he does not
have the legal education to ensure a basic understanding of the law that
must be applied. Even though the lay judge may have the best inten-
tions and try diligently to decide the issues fairly, without knowledge
of the law he has virtually nothing but his subjective impressions to
guide him. Dean Pound observed the importance of legal education:
81. The defendant's interest in a determination based on the legal merits is basic,
since his right to liberty is at stake. But the state's interest in obtaining a. just determi-
nation based on the law is no less important, since it has only a limited right to appeal
the verdict in a criminal case. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1466 (West 1970).
82. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. Id. at 345, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
84. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (procedure that leaves the preliminary
legal determination of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury is invalid in view
of the inability of the jury to disregard the substance of the confession in determining
admissibility and in determining guilt); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
(codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant cannot be used in a joint trial even
if jury is instructed that confession was admissible only against the declarant).
85. Salaries for justice court positions were very low at the time of the Gordon
decision-significantly lower than those of municipal court judges exercising the same
functions. See JuDIc)iLL COUNcIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 ANNUAL REP. 67-68. See also
text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
Fall 19751 1189
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Administration of justice according to law has six advantages: (1)
Law makes it possible to predict the course which the administra-
tion of justice will take; (2) law secures against errors of indi-
vidual judgment; (3) law secures against improper motives on the
part of those who administer justice; (4) law provides the magis-
trate with standards in which the ethical ideas of the community are
formulated; (5) law gives the magistrate the benefit of all the ex-
perience of his predecessors; (6) law prevents sacrifice of ultimate
interests, social and individual, to the more obvious and pressing
but less weighty, immediate interests. 8 6
In one of the earliest critical commentaries of the justice of the peace
system, Chester H. Smith observed the harmful consequences of a lack
of legal training, even where the judge is intelligent, impartial and sin-
cerely attempts to further justice:
With no training in the law, no training in the process of judicial
thought, no mental habit of mind which is acquired only by con-
stant experience in legal reasoning, it would indeed be strange if
a [lay judge] did not treat each case as a unique proposition. He
has no category or class into which he may place it, no analogies
from which to draw to solve the new problem before him. He has
no legal rules, principles or standards by which to judge the merits
of the controversy to be decided. Wholly unlike the judge who is
trained in the law, he has no precedents to guide him. In deciding
the cause before him, the [lay judge] is necessarily limited by his
own personal experience acquired in the short span of a single life-
time. He cannot call on the experience of the ages to assist him
but is helpless to do any more than apply his own personal notions
of right and wrong to the case at hand. The justice which such
tribunal is capable of dispensing is but the outcropping of the ex-
periences of a personality, often limited and warped by passion and
prejudice, and at best, as variable as the personalities of the jus-
tices who comprise [the system] .... Such justice in not justice
at all. It is "unequal, uncertain and capricious." 8"
A law degree and bar admission may not be an infallible test of
competency, but it at least guarantees a minimum level of exposure to
the law and to legal concepts which most laypersons lack.
In In re Gault"8 the Supreme Court pointed out the effects of a
judicial system lacking in substantive standards and noted that "[u]n-
bridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure."'8 9 In Gault the Court
addressed the problem of the nonattorney status of many juvenile court
judges, and observed that "good will, compassion and similar virtues
86. Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 709 (1913).
87. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CAL. L. Rv.
118, 127-28 (1927), quoting R. PouND, OUTLnEs OF LECrURES ON JURISPRUIDENCE 75
(3d ed. 1920).
88. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
89. Id. at 18.
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are. . . admirably prevalent throughout the system," but that "exper-
tise, ,the keystone of the whole venture, is lacking."9 The Court's
observations in Gault are equally applicable to the lay judge system as
a whole. Regardless of how "benevolently motivated," the lay judge's
innate sense of fairness cannot substitute for the consistent application
of legal principles that due process demands. The defendant will have
been denied due process if, despite having counsel appointed and his
case skillfully presented, the legal import of counsers arguments is
overlooked or misunderstood by the judge.9'
Unarticulated Constitutional Considerations
The Gordon holding is clearly and narrowly delimited to the
proposition that due process requires that an accused facing the pos-
sibility of incarceration upon conviction be given the opportunity to have
his case tried before an attorney judge. The decision suggests two in-
teresting ideas, however, that were not developed by the court: (1)
that the right to counsel may itself require a judge who can compre-
hend counsers arguments, and (2) that, given the duties and responsi-
bilities of the trial judge in light of the present complexity of criminal
law and procedure, due process may require that a judge be held to
certain additional standards of competency.
The right to counsel has been consistently extended since its origi-
nal application to state court prosecutions for capital offenses in Powell
v. Alabama.9 s In 1963 the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gideon v. Wainright made the right to appointment of counsel for an
indigent criminal defendant "a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial. ' 93 Although the Court had unequivocally declared in Powell that
"the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character,"
94 it
was not until the Gideon decision that the right was extended to all
felony defendants. Gideon held, in effect, that the law is too compli-
cated to consider it fair to incarcerate someone without offering him
the opportunity to be represented by an attorney. The court based its
holding on a presumption that a layperson is incapable of defending
himself or of adequately preparing a case for adjudication.
The progeny of Gideon clarified and extended the right to
counsel still further. In 1972 the Supreme Court made clear that
indigent defendants must be appointed counsel even in misdemeanor
trials and in fact whenever the defendant faces the possibility of impris-
90. Id. at 14-15 n.14, quoting Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HM'.v. L. REv. 775, 809 (1966).
91. 12 Cal. 3d at 325-26, 525 P.2d at 73, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
92. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
93. See 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
94. 287 U.S. at 68.
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onment upon conviction.9" The Court's decision in Coleman v.
Alabama9 6 determined that counsel must be offered the defendant
"at every step in the proceedings against him," including preliminary
examinations.
Since Gideon, the right to counsel in state courts has been
expanded substantively as well as procedurally. Subsequent decisions
have begun the formulation of certain standards for counsel, which are
necessary for "adequate" or "effective" representation. 8 Even before
Gideon it was established that the requirement of the right to counsel
in criminal cases cannot be met merely by appointing counsel "at such
time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid . . . ,99 Moreover, courts have not required inadequacy or mis-
management on an attorney's part before finding a deprivation of an
accused's right to effective representation. Defendants have been found
to have been deprived of effective counsel due to extrinsic factors beyond
counsers control. For example, where attorneys were appointed without
being given sufficient time to adequately prepare their cases' 00 or
95. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Argersinger the right to ap-
pointed counsel was extended to indigents charged with misdemeanors. The Court rea-
soned that the concepts involved in a misdemeanor trial were frequently as difficult and
weighty as those involved in felony proceedings. Therefore, a layperson could no more
be expected to effectively prepare a defense against misdemeanor than against felony
charges. Although the Court did not use equal protection as a rationale for extending
the Sixth Amendment right to misdemeanants, it did imply that where there was no ra-
tional reason to differentiate between classifications of crimes, due process should be ex-
tended equally in all cases. See id. at 32-36.
A similar argument may be made in favor of offering attorney judges equally to
all defendants facing loss of liberty, irrespective of geography. Thus, whether a person
must be tried by a nonattorney judge should not depend on whether the crime with
which the accused is charged was committed in a judicial district of over 40,000, which
would require its judges to be members of the bar, or just across the boundary line in
an adjacent judicial district of less than 40,000, which would allow a layperson to be
the defendant's judge. Such classifications based on geography should not in themselves
furnish a sufficient reason to justify unequal treatment .of persons where loss of liberty
is threatened.
96. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
97. Id. at 7, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). The Court held
in Coleman that the Alabama preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" of the state's
criminal process and that the defendant was as much entitled to counsel's aid at this stage
as at the trial itself. 399 U.S. at 10. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). There are, however, some pretrial proceedings to which the right need not be
extended. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682 (1972).
98. See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRN. L. Rnv. 1077 (1973);
Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Re-
lief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964).
99. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
100. United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947); United States v. Berg-
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where an excessive number of attorneys were appointed,101 courts
have held that the defendants were denied effective representation.
The Gordon opinion noted an "inherent inconsistency in guaran-
teeing a defendant an attorney to represent him without providing an
attorney judge to preside at the proceedings."'1 2  The court stopped
short of holding that the requirement of an attorney judge is actually
necessary for the effective assistance of counsel. Instead it perceived
the right to counsel and the right to an attorney judge as parallel rights
contained under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"since our legal system regards denial of counsel as a denial of funda-
mental fairness, it logically follows that the failure to provide a judge
qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments likewise
must be considered a denial of due process."'10 3
Having found that the right to an attorney judge is itself an essen-
tial element of due process, the court probably felt no need to broach
the question of whether an educated judge capable of understanding
counsel's arguments is necessarily incident to the right to effective
assistance of counsel. However, its reasoning does suggest acceptance
of the proposition that the right to counsel is nullified if counsel's argu-
ments fall on deaf ears.
A second aspect of the court's reasoning also warrants closer
examination. A substantial factor leading to the court's conclusion is
apparently the duties and responsibilities of the trial judge in determin-
ing and ruling on the rights of the accused. The opinion mentions,
for instance, that a lay judge may fail to recognize relevant constitu-
tional issues pertaining to a defendant's rights and may be unable to
determine whether an individual has engaged in constitutionally pro-
tected activities. 04 It also suggests that a lay judge may be unable to
rule properly on the admissibility of evidence, or to preside properly
over jury trials, which require "[s]ophisticated determinations regard-
ing the voir dire of jurors, the prejudicial effect of evidence and argu-
ment, and the submission of proper jury instructions . "... 105 Addi-
tionally, the opinion shows the court's concern over the lay judge's
ability to determine the acceptability of guilty pleas and to arrive at
proper sentencing decisions. 0 6 In stressing the active role that the trial
amo, 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Vasilick, 206 F. Supp. 195 (M.D.
Pa. 1962); cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
832 (1963). But cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970).
101. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); McKenzie v. Mississippi, 233 Miss.
216, 101 So. 2d 651 (1958).
102. 12 Cal. 3d at 333, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
103. Id. at 332, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
104. Id. at 330, 525 P.2d at 76-77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
105. Id. at 331, 525 P.2d at 77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
106. See id.
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judge must now play in a complex legal system, the opinion may fore-
cast an emerging recognition of the importance of a judge, albeit as
a fair and impartial arbiter, to insure that the defendant's rights are not
abridged in the courtroom. If such is the case, the criminal defendant
may have a greater stake in the quality and competence of the judge
than a law degree can insure, and the requirement that a judge be an
attorney should be only a minimal requirement of due process. Thus,
the question in issue is really the competence of the judge to fulfill these
responsibilities. The Gordon decision may, then, signal the recognition
of the importance of a judge to the protection of the rights of an accused,
and the evolution of the notion of judicial competence as an integral
element of due process.
Gordon is, of course, not the first case to hold that due process
guarantees that certain standards be applied to judges. In Tumey
v. Ohio' the Supreme Court of the United States examined a stat-
ute allowing the judge of a mayor's court to share in fees and costs
only in cases where the defendant was convicted. The court held that
where the judge had a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest"
in reaching a conclusion against the defendant, the resulting trial could
not be regarded as affording due process.' 08 In Ward v. Village of
Monroeville0 the Supreme Court held that the requirements of due
process prohibited a judge who was also mayor from presiding in a
criminal trial where the defendant's conviction would be of financial
benefit to his town.110 The test enunciated in Tumey was whether the pre-
siding official's situation was one "which would offer a possible temp-
tation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused. . ... "" In Ward the mayor who presided also had respon-
sibilities for revenue production and law enforcement in the town."'
The Court determined that this was a denial of the disinterested and
impartial tribunal guaranteed under the due process clause and enun-
ciated in Tumey." 3 Both Tumey and Ward hold only that a tribunal
must be disinterested and unbiased. The decisions indicate, however, that
the attitudes and attributes of a judge are at least relevant to the fair-
ness of a trial. The principles inherent in these decisions need not be
extended very far to require that the judge also be held to a certain
107. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
108. Id. at 523.
109. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
110. Id. at 60.
111. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
112. 409 U.S. at 58-59.
113. Id. at 60.
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standard of competence as well, since both a biased judge and an in-
competent judge would make rulings and decisions which might preju-
dice the defendant. Gordon is the first decision ,to hold that a judge
must not only be impartial, but also must be held to a standard of
competence.
In summation, the Gordon opinion raises two very persuasive
reasons for holding that an attorney judge is essential to the fair trial
of a criminal defendant: (1) thq defendant's right to the effective
assistance of counsel demands that his judge be capable of compre-
hending and utilizing counsel's legal arguments, and (2) the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial includes the right to a judge who is competent
to be the active courtroom participant in determining and protecting the
rights of the accused that the complex, modem legal system demands.
Under either analysis of the court's opinion, the "right to an attorney
judge" is merely a shorthand way of expressing the right to a competent
judge. If the California Supreme Court's reasoning is adopted, then its
holding that a judge presiding over a criminal trial must be an attorney
should be established as only a minimal standard of competence.
IV. Legislatively Imposed Standards of Judicial Competence
The lay judge is still being used in most states of the United States.
A dozen states have abolished the office'14 and at least eight more (in-
cluding California) have substantially restricted the lay judge's criminal
jurisdiction," 5 but the remaining states still allow the lay judge consid-
erable authority to determine the rights of criminal defendants. It is
likely, therefore, that the issues of the Gordon case will be relitigated
in other forums in the future."16
114. States which have abolished lay judges entirely are Connecticut, District of
Columbia. Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma
and Virginia. See text accompanying notes 133-51 infra.
115. These states are California, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Vermont and Wyoming. See text accompanying notes 152-65 infra.
116. Three cases involving similar issues have already come before the courts of
other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals of Arizona in Crouch v. Tustice of the Peace
Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440 P.2d 1000 (1968), cursorily dismissed the appellant's con-
tentions that he was entitled to an attorney judge as a matter of due process. The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky in Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (1972), however, dis-
cussed the issues of due process, equal protection and trial de novo as they relate to the
lay judge, and came to conclusions directly contrary to those found in Gordon. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals found that the Kentucky lay judge system did not deprive
the defendant of due process or of equal protection of the law, and its procedure of de
novo review would probably save the system even if found to be lacking in due process
in the first instance. In March of this year the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed
a denial of state habeas cor~us relief to a petitioner who claimed the judgment was void
because the judge who convicted him was not an attorney. The judgment was affirmed
in light of the court's previous decision in Ditty v. Hampton, and probable jurisdiction
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Most of the criticisms of the lay judge have been addressed to
justice of the peace courts. 117 The office of justice of the peace has tra-
ditionally been the repository of the lay judge's power. However,
nonattorney judges are also found in municipal, police, village, city,
mayors' and magistrates' courts. Constitutional challenges could be
raised against their use in any of these courts. Convictions for vio-
lations of city ordinances, for example, often involve the possibility
of imprisonment, even though the violations are not always classified
as misdemeanors. A village court judge may be depriving the defend-
ant of due process by presiding over a prosecution for such a violation,
even though this may be his only criminal law function.
It may be that the lay judge cannot realistically or beneficially be
retired from office overnight. Overcrowded courts are a problem in
many states and the lay judge probably takes some of the strain off an
already overtaxed professional judiciary. The convenience of many
small-volume courts cannot be doubted in areas of low population
density."18 Moreover, there may be a very real lack of attorneys in
has been noted by the United States Supreme Court. 43 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 24,
1975).
Most of the cases which have considered the lay judge status of lower court judges
have not even considered the constitutional issues. See State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91
A. 274 (1914) (since probate judge need not be attorney, disbarment does not affect
official status); State ex rel. Sellars v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924) (official
acts of judge not illegal because state laws do not explicitly require municipal court judge
to be attorney); In re Hudson County, 106 NJ.L. 62, 144 A. 169 (1928) (nothing in
state constitution requires judge of Court of Errors and Appeals to be lawyer); City of
Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969) (absent constitutional or
statutory requirement, judges or magistrates need not be attorneys).
Other state courts have invalidated state statutes establishing the requirement that
judges be attorneys because the state constitutions involved did not state such a require-
ment See Attorney Gen. ex rel. Cook v. O'Neill, 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445 (1937)
(legislature has no power to annex qualifications for circuit court judges which are not
found in state constitution); Mississippi County v. Green, 200 Ark. 204, 138 S.W.2d 377
(1940) (unconstitutional for legislature to add requirements for judgeships in county,
probate and common pleas courts to those enumerated in constitution); Spruill v. Bate-
man, 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913) (statute creating additional qualifications invalid
since constitution provides that all voters are eligible for office).
As the Gordon opinion mentions, however, none" of these opinions have satisfacto-
rily resolved the inconsistency of requiring that the accused be represented by counsel
and yet allowing an untrained and sometimes uneducated judge to preside. 12 Cal. 3d
at 333, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
117. See note 14 supra.
118. The increasing complexity of the justice system, however, may be making even
the convenience of local courts obsolete. The California Lower Court Study reported
that a major defect in the justice court system in California was the "[u]nproductive and
often heavy travel time requirements of persons who serve the court, such as prosecutors,
defense counsel, reporters and transporters of defendants in custody" due to the incon-
venient locations of the justice courts, many of which have no other reason for existence
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many areas of the country that necessitates the use of nonattorney
judges to a greater extent.
Even if it is determined that lay judges are needed in some states,
however, it is necessary to question whether they are needed to pre-
side over criminal trials. It may be possible to formulate systems which
would guarantee the defendant the right to be heard before a judge
who is an attorney when the defendant's liberty is threatened, without
abolishing lay judges entirely.
In California the Gordon decision left lay judges with author-
ity to preside over all civil cases within their statutory jurisdiction and
with authority to preside over any criminal case which does not involve
the possibility of imprisonment. The court was careful to point out
that a waiver of the right to an attorney judge by the defendant
is permissible.119 The Gordon opinion also suggested two possible
means of implementing the decision: (1) a cause of action which gives
rise to the right to an attorney judge might be transferred to another
judicial district in the same county, or (2) the Judicial Council could
assign an attorney judge from another area to the cause of action.
120
Each of these alternatives would seem to be a relatively unburdensome
way in which to guarantee the defendant a competent and learned
tribunal.
Although each of the suggested alternatives would have made use
of -a procedure already available under the existing system,' 2 ' shortly
after Gordon was handed down California passed new legislation imple-
menting the decision. The legislature added Government Code sections
71700 - 71704,122 which provide for temporary justice court circuit
judgeships financed out of the state treasury. Each judge appointed
to a circuit judgeship will be the presiding judge in the judicial district
in which the judgeship is created.123 The judgeships will be filled by
attorneys who have been members of the state bar for five years, be-
come inactive members of the bar at the time of appointment, and are
certified by the Judicial Council to be acceptable for judicial assignment
than their historical locations. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., CALI ORNI Lowr
COURT STUDY 24 (1971).
119. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 333-34, 525 P.2d 72, 79, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 632, 639 (1974). The court did not discuss the question of whether a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to an attorney judge would be necessary or, if such
waiver is necessary, whether the lay judge could be capable of determining that the
waiver was intelligently made.
120. Id.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1035 authorizes transfer of cases and California Constitu-
tion, article 6, § 6 provides for assignment of judges.
122. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 71700-04 (West Supp. 1975).
123. Id. § 71700(c).
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to other courts.124 The salaries of the justice court attorney judges will
be $30,000 per year, and the salaries of all attorney judges already
holding justice court judgeships will be raised to the same figure. 25
The state will reimburse the counties for this increase in compensa-
tion. 126  The legislation provides additionally that every justice court
vacancy occurring after January 7, 1975, must be filled by an attorney
judge.'
27
The new legislation goes beyond the holding in the Gordon de-
cision, implementing recommendations made by the California Lower
Court Study in 1971. The Lower Court Study found, for example, that
the lack of legal knowledge in the justice court system was compounded
by the absence of attorney judges with whom lay judges could con-
sult on legal issues.' 28 The provision in the new legislation which
makes attorney judges presiding judges of their judicial district should
provide a higher quality of justice for defendants who are not faced
with imprisonment, by offering nonattorney judges a trained attorney
in a position of authority with whom to consult. The salary of the full-
time judgeships created will be sufficient to attract lawyers to these
positions. The phasing out of all nonattorney justices upon expiration
of their terms is not necessitated by the Gordon decision, but will result
in a more efficient and learned tribunal for all parties, regardless of
whether loss of liberty is threatened. It seems safe to predict that this
legislation will facilitate a changeover to a unified trial court system in
the near future.
The legislatures of many other states have registered their concern
with the quality of justice administered by lay judges, and their attempts
at reforming antiquated and overly complex court systems have often
included restrictions on the powers of lay judges. States other than
California have attempted to deal with the problem of the nonattorney
judge and the constitutional questions that it presents through a variety
of devices. Twelve jurisdictions have eliminated lay judges entirely. 129
The majority of the remaining states which have dealt with the problem
have used one or more of the following measures: (a) restricting the
criminal jurisdiction of the lay judge;'30 (b) providing for transfer of
proceedings at the defendant's request or requiring the defendants
124. Id. § 71702(a).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 71702(b).
127. Id. § 71701.
128. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., CALIFORNIU LOWER COURT STUDY 9 (1971).
129. They are Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Virginia. See text accompany-
ing notes 133-51 infra.
130. See text accompanying notes 152-65 infra.
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consent to trial by a lay judge;:" 1 (c) providing for trial de novo before
an attorney judge on appeal."3" Unlike California, these states have
proceeded entirely through legislative channels.
A. States Which Have Eliminated Lay Judges Entirely
The trend toward the abolition of the lay judge is of recent
development. When New Jersey began eliminating lay judges in
1947,113 it stood alone in its transition to a totally professional judiciary.
Connecticut, following New Jersey's example in 1960, repealed the en-
abling legislation of justice of the peace courts and transferred their
jurisdiction to newly created circuit courts,' 34 whose judges were
required to be admitted to the Connecticut bar. 3 5 In 1964 Maine
adopted a new judicial article3 6 and eliminated various courts of
limited jurisdiction,137 retaining justices of the peace in ministerial
capacities only.
138
Most of the states which limit lay judge criminal jurisdiction have
converted to the use of attorney judges within the past six years.
Michigan and Oklahoma abolished their courts of limited jurisdiction
in 1969 and replaced them with district courts whose judges must be
attorneys." 9 And since 1970, all judges in the states of Illinois' 40 and
Missouri' 41 and in the District of Columbia 4 2 have been required to
be licensed to practice law. In 1970 Hawaii replaced its magistrate's
courts with district courts. 3 The judges of the new district courts are
required to be attorneys who have been "licensed to practice in all the
courts of the State for at least five years."' 44
The Maryland Constitution was revised in 1971 to require that all
judges in the state must first be admitted to the practice of law, 4 5 and
the district court of Maryland was created to supplant all other courts
of limited jurisdiction. 146 In 1973 Iowa abolished all lay courts147 and
131. See text accompanying notes 166-75 infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 176-86 infra.
133. See N.J. STAT. AN. § 2A:8-12 (1952).
134. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. "§ 51-273 (1958).
135. CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 6 (1965).
136. See generally ME. CONsT. art. 6.
137. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 152 (1964).
138. ME. R~v. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1001 (1964).
139. MrcH. COMP. LAws H§ 600.8201, 600.9921 (Supp. 1975); OKrA. STAT. ANN.
tit 20, § 91.1 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. CNST. art. 7, § 8.
140. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 11.
141. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 25.
142. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1501(b) (Cum. Supp. 1970),
143. See Hwxn REv. STAT. § 604-1 (Supp. 1974).
144. Id. § 604-2.
145. MD. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
146. Id. § 41-1(h).
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converted to a uniform trial court system,14 8 completing the final stage
in its court reform process.
Justices of the peace and other inferior court offices were
abolished in Virginia in 1974"'1 and were replaced by the general dis-
trict court.150 All full-time judges of the district court of Virginia must
now be attorneys.' 5
B. States Which Have Curtailed Lay Judges' Criminal
Jurisdiction Significantly
The statutes of some states permit lay judges to hold office, but
either give them no criminal jurisdiction at all or permit them to mete
out fines alone as punishment. Georgia and Louisiana both have
retained justices of the peace,' 5" 'but limit them to issuing arrest war-
rants, acting as conservators of the peace, and acting as committing
magistrates. 153  They do not have any jurisdiction over misdemean-
ors."' Similarly, Rhode Island limits the criminal authority of justices
of the peace who are not lawyers to the issuance of arrest warrants. 155
Justices of the peace who are members of the bar, however, may be
appointed to "take bail" as well.' 55
Justices of the peace have been substantially eliminated in
Minnesota. Since 1971, justices have been required to step down from
their offices. upon expiration of their terms in every municipality where
the county court holds regular sessions.' 5" Only one justice of the
peace per county court district may be appointed or elected' 5 and the
justices' authority in criminal cases is limited to accepting guilty pleas,
imposing fines, and releasing defendants with or without bail in misde-
meanor cases.' 59 Justices who are members of the bar may issue war-
147. IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.36 (Supp. 1975).
148. Id. § 602.1.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-378 (Cam. Supp. 1975).
150. Id. § 16.1-69.7.
151. Id. § 16.1-69.9(c).
152. GA. CoDE ANN. § 24-402 (1935); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 47.
153. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1501 (1935); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 48. See also LA.
CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 161 (1967) (abolishes authority of justices of the peace to issue
search warrants except in cases where such authority is otherwise specially conferred by
law).
154. See LA. CONST. art. 7, § 48; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1501 (1935).
155. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 4 12-6-4 (Supp. 1974). See also R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 12-10-2 (Supp. 1974) (providing that justices of the peace may not issue search war-
rants).
156. R.I. Gm. LAws ANN. § 12-10-2 (Supp. 1974).
157. MrmN. STAT. ANN. § 487.35(1) (Supp. 1975).
158. Id. § 487.35(2).
159. Id.
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rants and other criminal processes, but lay justices do not have this
authority.160
The judicial authority of justices of the peace has been reduced
in most counties in Tennessee to accepting appearance bonds and per-
forming other minor acts.' Even where justices still are permitted
jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses, they are limited to issuing fines
of up to $50, and only in cases where the defendant pleads guilty.'62
Wyoming gives justices of the peace no authority to preside over mis-
demeanors 63 but authorizes them to issue warrants.'6 4 It provides,
nevertheless, that vacancies in the office must be filled by attorneys,
unless none are available. 165
C. States Which Require Defendant's Consent or
Provide for the Right to Transfer
A few states have confronted the constitutional issue presented by
the use of lay judges by giving the accused an alternative forum in
which to defend. This is a seemingly fair solution and a workable pro-
cedure for states which depend on lay judges to administer justice. It
might be a workable alternative for those states, for example, which
still have a scarcity of attorneys in rural areas or for those states which
do not have the funds needed to provide salaries attractive to attorneys.
Alaska's statutes provide that the magistrate's office may be filled
by a layperson.16 6 Although the magistrate's jurisdiction extends to all
misdemeanors and violations of ordinances the magistrate may not pre-
side over a defendant's trial unless the defendant consents in writing
to trial by the magistrate or unless he pleads guilty.'
67
In South Dakota and Wisconsin an accused in a criminal case is
given the right to have his case transferred to a court where he will
be guaranteed an attorney judge.' 68  South Dakota magistrates are not
required to be lawyers; 69 yet, they have misdemeanor jurisdiction over
offenses committed within their counties where punishment is not
greater than a $100 fine and/or 30 days imprisonment.' 70 However,
160. Id.
161. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-312 (Cum. Supp. 1974), § 19-202 (1955).
162. Id. § 40-407 (1955).
163. Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 22, giving misdemeanor jurisdiction to justices of the
peace, was repealed as of January 17, 1967 (Supp. 1975).
164. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-413 (1957) (justices may issue arrest warrants only).
165. Id. § 5-99.1, 5-99.2 (Supp. 1975).
166. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 22.15.160(b) (1962), as amended by 117 S.L.A. 1967,
ch. 117, § 1.
167. Id. § 22.15.120(4), (6), (7).
168. S.D. CODE § 16-12A-17 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.055 (1971).
169. S.D. CODE § 16-12A-6 (Supp. 1974).
170. Id. § 16-12A-16.
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defendants in any criminal, quasi-criminal or civil action pending in a
magistrate's court may upon oral or written request, have their cases
-transferred to a court presided over by a law-trained magistrate or circuit
judge assigned by the presiding judge.'7 '
Wisconsin municipal court justices have jurisdiction over viola-
tions of ordinances of cities, towns or villages in the county where
the municipal court is located. 7 ' Although the justices are not re-
quired to have any legal education, 73 Wisconsin statutory law prohibits
them from presiding over jury trials. 174 The defendant is informed of
his right to a jury trial and if he elects to exercise this right, his case
is transferred to the county court for trial before an attorney judge. 5
D. States Offering a Trial de Novo in an Appellate Court
In many states, appeals from justice of the peace and other
informal courts involve a trial de novo to a court presided over by an
attorney judge, either automatically on appeal or at the defendant's re-
quest. Although it causes the defendant greater hardships and incon-
venience than would providing an attorney judge in the first instance,
this procedure certainly comes far closer to meeting the demands of
due process than does the failure to provide an attorney judge alto-
gether. If the possibility of the lay judge's incompetence exists, it is
better to offer a trial in an assuredly competent tribunal in a de novo
hearing than to deny this right completely.
Accordingly, of the states which give lay judges original criminal
jurisdiction, many provide for a trial de novo before an attorney judge
upon appeal.' 7  Thus, if the defendant is dissatisfied with the decision
of the lay judge, he may, in effect, try again in another tribunal with
an attorney judge. The right to a de novo trial is not exercised without
cost, however. Two trials cost more in terms of time and money than
does one, and the chance of a longer sentence on retrial may chill the
defendant's exercise of his right to appeal.' 77
171. Id. § 16-12A-17.
172. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 254.045 (1971).
173. See Id. § 254.01.
174. Id. § 300.04 (Supp. 1975).
175. Id. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.055 (1971) (county judges must be li-
censed to practice law). It should be noted, however, that Wisconsin statutes offer no
relief to the defendant who is threatened with less than a six-month imprisonment.
176. See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-374 (Supp. 1974); DEL. CoNsr. art. 4, § 28;
KY. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25.070 (1970); NEV. REv. STAT. § 189.050 (1957); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-15-1, 36-15-3, 38-1-13 (1953); N.D.R. CRIM. PRo. 37(g) (1974 RIPL.
VOL); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-57-43 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.410 (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. § 300.10(5) (Supp. 1975).
177. But see Chaffin v. Stynchcomb, 412 U.S. 17, 33 (1973).
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Although the California system contained a limited de novo proce-
dure,178 the California Supreme Court did not address this issue in
Gordon v. Justice Court, implying by omission that it considers de novo
review an insufficient protection.179  The United States Supreme
Court's position on de novo appeal is unclear. In Ward v. Village of
Monroeville,18 0 it stated that the denial of an impartial judge could
not be cured by trial de novo in another court, since the defendant is
entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.'18  In
Colten v. Kentucky," 2 however, the Supreme Court described Ken-
tucky's procedure of de novo trial appeal in this way:
In reality the defendant's choices are to accept the decision of -the
judge and the sentence imposed in the inferior court or to reject
what in effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his case and
seek the judgment of judge or jury in the superior court, with sen-
tence to be determined by the full record made in that court.'8 3
The dual-trial system outlined above hardly seems to comport with
notions of the right to a fair trial in the first instance, but this de minimis
attitude toward the original trial is reflected in the opinions of state
courts as well. The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, has held
that even denial of counsel is not a deprivation of due process where
the case is tried de novo on appeal with counsel. 8 4
The "voluntary" nature of the defendant's exercise of his right to
appeal has been used to justify the relaxation of certain constitutional
protections on appeal. For example, the double jeopardy clause is not
178. California statutes provide for a limited trial de novo on appeal from a justice
court to a county superior court upon a final judgment of conviction. Appeals from
questions of fact or from questions of both law and fact are tried anew in the superior
court. CAL. Crv. PRo. CODE §§ 904.4, 910 (West Supp. 1975). Appeals on questions
of law alone are heard by the superior court acting in a regular appellate proceeding.
Id. § 910. Thus, important questions of law, which a lay judge would have the most
difficult time deciding, would go up on appeal based solely upon a statement of the
case prepared by the nonattorney judge himself. If, however, the reviewing court
orders a new trial on an appeal on a question of law, the new trial is heard in the su-
perior court to which the appeal was taken. Id.
179. The court did discuss the attorney general's argument that the right to
appeal from a justice court judgment is a sufficient guarantee of due process, dismissing
it as having no merit. The court found that "an appeal from a justice court judgment
is particularly inadequate to guarantee a fair trial since justice courts are not courts
of record, CAL. CONST., art. 6, § 1, and thus no transcript is ordinarily made of the
original proceeding." Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 332, 525 P.2d 72,
77-78, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 637-38 (1974).
180. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
181. Id. at 61-62.
182. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
183. Id. at 105.
184. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967). See also Doss v.
State, 252 F. Supp. 298, 305 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Spriggs v. State, 243 F. Supp. 57, 60
(M.D.N.C. 1965).
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applicable to a defendant's appeal from conviction. 185 However, the
existence of the defendant's right to a de novo appeal should not be
used as a rationale for the refusal of the state to offer the defendant
a fair trial in the first instance.
E. Other Alternatives Suggested by State Statutes
Many states have attempted to assure the lay judge's ability to deal
with judicial duties by establishing either mandatory training seminars or
qualifying examinations or both. California was one of the first states to
institute a qualifying examination, which tested aspiring justice court
judges on selected concepts of law and procedure. 8" Pennsylvania and
Washington require prospective lay judges to pass similar examinations
on the duties and functions of their prospective offices.187 The Gordon
opinion, however, found the California qualifying examination to be far
inferior to the California Bar Examination and an insufficient guaranty
of a lay judge's ability to fulfill the responsibilities of the office.'
At least eleven states require that lay judges attend training
institutes or educational courses on court procedure and substantive
law.189 However, none of the courses offered last more than a few
days and most do not even involve a formal testing of the lay judge
on the materials taught.
Many legislatures recognize the desirability of having attorney
judges whenever and wherever possible. These states have tried to
limit the extent to which their courts depend on lay judges by providing
that only the smaller of a certain class of political subdivision may have
a lay judge presiding or by providing that a lay judge may not take
office unless there are no attorneys available for the position.'
185. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23 (1973); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919).
186. Hennessey, supra note 25 at 470.
187. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 12(b) (1969); WAsH. REv. CODE § 3.34.060 (Supp. 1974)
(districts of less than 10,000 only).
188. 'Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 329, 525 P.2d 72, 76, 115 Cal. Rptr.
632, 636 (1974).
189. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-203(5) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 1-2206(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-11-3 (1972); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-
401 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-508(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 4.035, 4.036, 5.025, 5.026 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-204 (1953), § 37-1-10
(Supp. 1973); N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 20(c); N.Y. UJ.C.A. § 105 (Supp. 1974); PA.
CONST. art. 5, § 12(b); PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 1214 (Supp. 1975); S.D. CODE §§ 16-12-
6.1, 16-12A-8, 16-12A-9 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-27 (Supp. 1975).
190. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-203(2), (3) (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-4105 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 502-A:3 (1968); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 36-2-1 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 3.34.060 (Supp. 1974).
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A few legislatures have been thwarted in their efforts to assure an
adequate judiciary by state courts which have held that their state legis-
latures have no authority to add qualifications to those enumerated in
their state constitutions.
19'
It can be concluded from this brief survey of state statutes that
many state legislatures have shown serious concern over the inability
of lay judges to handle difficult problems of substantive law and proce-
dure. Legislative attempts to assure a competent judiciary evidence
a recognition of the necessity of well-trained and learned judges to
assure defendants the fair trial which due process demands. State
legislatures have attempted such solutions to the problem as examina-
tions, training courses, the right to transfer, and the right to de novo
trial on appeal.
However laudable these attempts at raising the standards of jus-
tice may be, most of the attempted solutions cannot meet the require-
ments of due process if the ability of a judge is recognized as relevant
to the fairness of a defendant's trial. Only those states which have
abolished lay judge criminal jurisdiction altogether have court systems
which are not vulnerable to constitutional attack. Qualifying examina-
tions and training institutes which are short in length and superficial
in nature cannot be deemed a sufficient guaranty of a judge's compe-
tence. Providing qualified judges only to defendants in larger political
subdivisions results in unequal systems of justice within the same state.
Although the latter alternative may evidence a good faith attempt to
raise the standard of justice, it does nothing for the individual forced
to stand trial before a judge who is unversed in legal principle. Pro-
viding a right to transfer may be a practical solution for less populated
states, but the right should be unqualified and even the lay judge's
ability to accept guilty pleas must be scrutinized carefully. Whether
denial of a competent judge can be remedied by de novo trial in a
forum presided over by an attorney is questionable at best, and cannot
even be justified as being an efficient means of providing this element
of due process. Judicial economy will not be served by requiring a
criminal defendant to litigate his case twice in order to obtain a compe-
tent judge.
In the area of judicial competence, court reform, which is tradi-
tionally a subject for state legislatures, overlaps the right to a fair trial,
a constitutional right which it is the duty of courts to protect. Although
court reform is tending in the direction of greater protection of the in-
dividual, it has not yet reached the degree of protection in most states
which has been mandated in California by the Gordon decision. By
their very nature, legislative reforms tend more to compromise than do
191. See note 113 supra.
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court-imposed standards respecting personal rights. Furthermore,
legislatively imposed court reform trends change, and judicial qualifica-
tions may be removed as well as imposed at the will of the legislature.
It is time to recognize the importance of the judge's competence to the
proteotion of a defendant's constitutional rights. The constitutional
rights of the individual should not be left unprotected in the hands of
the legislature, to be granted at its discretion.
Conclusion
A comptetent judiciary is necessary to a fair trial. Legislative
measures have stopped short of guaranteeing the defendant the compe-
tent tribunal which fairness requires. The Gordon decision, by estab-
lishing the defendant's right to an attorney judge in California when
loss of liberty is threatened, has taken the first step toward constitu-
tionally requiring a responsible judiciary. Hopefully, other courts will
confront these issues and will impose this minimal requirement of
competence on the judiciary itself.
